Initial vibeproxy implementation
Self-contained HTTP/HTTPS/TCP/UDP reverse proxy manager written in Go, with SQLite storage, a Bootstrap 5 admin UI (Go templates, no JS framework), and a REST API under /api/v1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QTXFrNP1imCW7jtfL5SZrw
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package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/base64"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/owen/vibeproxy/internal/database"
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)
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type ctxKey string
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const actorCtxKey ctxKey = "actor"
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func ActorFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
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if v, ok := ctx.Value(actorCtxKey).(string); ok {
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return v
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}
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return "unknown"
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}
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// BasicAuthAdmin protects the web UI with HTTP Basic Auth against the
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// single stored admin account.
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func BasicAuthAdmin(db *sql.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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username, password, ok := r.BasicAuth()
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if !ok {
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unauthorized(w)
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return
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}
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user, err := database.GetUserByUsername(db, username)
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if err != nil {
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unauthorized(w)
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return
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}
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valid, err := VerifyPassword(password, user.PasswordHash)
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if err != nil || !valid {
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unauthorized(w)
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), actorCtxKey, username)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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func unauthorized(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="vibeproxy"`)
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http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}
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// APIToken protects the REST API with a bearer token checked against
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// hashed tokens stored in the database.
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func APIToken(db *sql.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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tok := bearerToken(r)
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if tok == "" {
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"missing bearer token"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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hash := HashAPIToken(tok)
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rec, err := database.GetAPITokenByHash(db, hash)
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if err != nil || rec.RevokedAt != nil {
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid or revoked token"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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go database.TouchAPIToken(db, rec.ID)
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), actorCtxKey, "token:"+rec.Name)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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func bearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
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h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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const p = "Bearer "
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if len(h) > len(p) && h[:len(p)] == p {
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return h[len(p):]
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}
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return ""
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}
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// CSRF implements a double-submit-cookie style CSRF protection for the
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// server-rendered web UI (which authenticates via Basic Auth and so has no
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// session to bind a per-session token to).
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type CSRF struct {
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secret []byte
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}
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func NewCSRF() *CSRF {
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s := make([]byte, 32)
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rand.Read(s)
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return &CSRF{secret: s}
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}
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const csrfCookieName = "vp_csrf"
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func (c *CSRF) sign(nonce string) string {
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, c.secret)
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mac.Write([]byte(nonce))
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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}
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// Token issues (and sets a cookie for) a fresh CSRF token for rendering
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// into a form's hidden field.
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func (c *CSRF) Token(w http.ResponseWriter) string {
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nonceB := make([]byte, 16)
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rand.Read(nonceB)
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nonce := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(nonceB)
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sig := c.sign(nonce)
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value := nonce + "." + sig
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: csrfCookieName,
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Value: value,
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Path: "/",
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HttpOnly: true,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
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Expires: time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour),
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})
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return value
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}
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// Protect rejects unsafe requests whose form value doesn't match the
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// double-submitted cookie.
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func (c *CSRF) Protect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method == http.MethodGet || r.Method == http.MethodHead || r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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cookie, err := r.Cookie(csrfCookieName)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "CSRF token missing", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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formTok := r.FormValue("csrf_token")
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if formTok == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(formTok), []byte(cookie.Value)) != 1 {
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http.Error(w, "CSRF token invalid", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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